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Abstract
In 1932, von Neumann argued for the equivalence of the thermodynamic entropy and
−Trρ ln ρ, since known as the von Neumann entropy. Hemmo and Shenker (2006) recently
challenged this argument by pointing out an alleged discrepancy between the two entropies
in the single particle case, concluding that they must be distinct. In this article, their
argument is shown to be problematic as it a) allows for a violation of the second law of
thermodynamics and b) is based on an incorrect calculation of the von Neumann entropy.
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1 Introduction
In Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik von Neumann introduces −Trρ ln ρ
as the quantum mechanical generalisation of the phenomenological thermodynamic
entropy, where ρ is the quantum mechanical density operator1. In his argument, he
considers the cyclic transformation of a quantum gas confined to a box. By demanding
that the overall entropy change of system and heat bath must be zero by the end of the
cycle2, von Neumann concludes that the entropy of the quantum gas ought to be given by
−Trρ ln ρ. Hemmo and Shenker (2006) recently challenged this argument by pointing out
an alleged discrepancy between the two entropies in the single particle case, concluding
that they must be distinct. In this article I demonstrate that their argument against the
equivalence of thermodynamic and von Neumann entropy is problematic as it a) allows for
a violation of the second law of thermodynamics and b) is based on an incorrect calculation
of the von Neumann entropy. The article is structured as follows: after a summary of von
Neumann’s original argument, I will quickly revisit the debate that has been lead to date
by Shenker (1999) and Henderson (2003) before moving on to an analysis of Hemmo and
Shenker’s (2006) most recent contribution, which will be shown to be problematic.
2 The Argument
To fully appreciate Hemmo and Shenker’s criticism, it is helpful to begin by recapitulating
von Neumann’s argument as presented in his Mathematische Grundlagen.
2.1 The Setup
Von Neumann begins by considering N non-interacting, quantum systems, denoted by
S1, ...,SN . For the purpose of this paper, we take these systems to be two-state quantum
systems and only consider, say, the spin states of a spin-12 particle.
3 Each of these systems
is placed in a box Ki, with i = 1, ...N , whose walls shield its contained system off from its
environment and thus prevent any interaction between systems. The boxes K1, ...,KN are
1Von Neumann considers two types of processes that describe how the quantum state changes in time.
The first, ‘Prozess 1’, is associated with the probabilistic outcome of a measurement, whereas ‘Prozess 2’
refers to the evolution of the system via the Schrödinger equation. −Trρ ln ρ is shown to be non-decreasing
for both of them.
2An explicit assumption of the validity of the second law.
3A generalisation to more degrees of freedom is straight forward and may be found in (von Neumann,
1996, pp.191–201).
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now all placed into another, much larger box K¯ of volume V . For simplification, von
Neumann assumes that there are no force fields, in particular no gravitational fields,
present in K¯. This in turn means that there is no gravitational interaction between the
boxes K1, ...,KN , even though they may exchange kinetic energy via collisions. The boxes
can thus be taken to behave just like molecules of a gas. Von Neumann calls this
‘quantum gas’ a [S1, ...,SN ]-gas, where [S1, ...,SN ] is the statistical ensemble associated
with the systems. A more detailed analysis of von Neumann’s understanding of such an
ensemble, or Gesamtheit, will be presented in Section 6. The large box K¯ can be brought
into thermal contact with a heat bath at temperature T and in that case, after some
equilibration time, the [S1, ...,SN ]-gas itself will be at temperature T .4 Finally, we add an
empty box K¯′ of equal volume V to the right of K¯.
2.2 The Process
The [S1, ...,SN ]-gas now undergoes a series of transitions. The following various stages are
also illustrated in Figure 1.5
Stage I: Each of the two-level quantum systems Si initially is in the pure state
|0〉 = w1 |+〉+ w2 |−〉, where the states |+〉 and |−〉 can be taken to be spin eigenstates of
a spin-half particle. Given the lack of interaction between the quantum systems, the
density matrix of the overall system factorises as ρ = ρ1 ⊗ ...⊗ ρN with ρi = |0〉〈0|.
Stage II: Each system is now measured in the {|+〉,|−〉}-basis, resulting in a mixture
with w21N particles in state |+〉 and w22N particles in state |−〉.
Stage III & IV: The |+〉- and |−〉-systems are now separated in the following manner.
The wall between K¯ and K¯′ is replaced with a movable partition and a fixed
semipermeable membrane6. This first semipermeable membrane is transparent to
|−〉-systems but impermeable to |+〉-systems. From the very left of K¯, another
semipermeable membrane is inserted. It is movable and furthermore transparent to
|+〉-systems, while being impermeable to |−〉-systems. The |−〉-systems are now ’pushed’
into the right box K¯′ by moving this second semipermeable membrane and the movable
4For a more detailed account of this equilibration process, see (von Neumann, 1996, pp.192–193).
5The presentation of the argument given here slightly differs from its original. Instead of having the gas
undergo a cyclic process (in Figure 1, the system is in the same state at Stages I and VII), von Neumann
separately considers the system’s entropy changes for Stages II to VII (von Neumann, 1996, pp.200–202)
and Stages I to II (von Neumann, 1996, pp.202–206). The cyclic version was chosen to be consistent
with the presentation of von Neumann’s argument in (Shenker, 1999; Henderson, 2003) and (Hemmo and
Shenker, 2006).
6For such a semipermeable membrane to exist in principle, the two states need to be orthogonal.
Mixtures instead of pure states are also conceivable, as long as they are disjoint.
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Figure 1: An illustration of von Neumann’s argument. (I) The individual two-state quantum
systems are each in state |0〉 = w1 |+〉+ w2 |−〉, indicated by bicoloured circles. For illustrative
purposes, we assume w1 = w2 = 1√2 . (II) After the measurement in the |+〉 / |−〉-basis, the
system is now described by a statistical mixture of |+〉- (white) and |−〉-systems (black). (III)
The |+〉- and |−〉-systems are now separated by using semi-permeable membranes to ’push’ the
|−〉-systems into the right box K¯. (IV) The |+〉- and |−〉-systems are now completely separated.
(V) The two boxes are compressed to half of their respective volumes. (VI) The |+〉- and
|−〉-gases are now transformed back into their original state of superposition. (VII) The partition
is removed. In this figure, no heat bath is present, but we assume that it exists in the background
and takes up the dissipated entropy at 4→ 5.
partition in the center simultaneously and quasi-statically to the right, keeping the
enclosed volume constant at all times (see Figure 1, Stage III, for an illustration of this
5
step). During this process, no work is done on the gas and no heat is exchanged with the
heat bath. Eventually, all the |−〉-systems will be in K¯′, while the |+〉-systems remain in
the left box (Figure 1, Stage IV).
Stage V: The two boxes are now isothermally compressed to volumes w21V and w22V .
Figure 1 illustrates this step for w21 = w22 = 12 . The particle densities in K¯ and K¯′ change
from w21N/V and w22N/V to N/V where, as before, N is the total number of systems.
The entropy of the heat reservoir increases by NkBw21 lnw21 and NkBw22 lnw22 respectively,
where kB is the Boltzmann constant.
Stage VI: The |+〉- and |−〉-gases are then reversibly transformed back into a |0〉-gas via
unitary operations.
Stage VII: Finally, the partition between the two chambers is removed, restoring the
original state of the gas.
Von Neumann’s now argues as follows: all transitions between Stages II and VII take place
in a reversible fashion, which means that the total entropy change of gas and heat bath
between II and VII must be zero. Since a total amount of ∆S = NkB [w21 lnw21 + w22 lnw22]
has been dumped into the heat bath during the compression stage, and since the (normed)
entropy of the final |0〉-gas is zero by definition, the entropy of the gas must have been
S = S+ + S− = −NkB [w21 lnw21 + w22 lnw22] before. Later in his book, von Neumann
explains that the measurement process (’Prozess 1’) is responsible for the entropy increase
between Stages I and II (von Neumann, 1996, pp.202–206).
The above considerations are easily generalised to more dimensions: for a system
described by a density matrix ρ with eivenvectors |φ1〉 , ..., |φn〉 and eigenvalues w1, ..., wn,
the entropy is then given by Sρ = −Trρ ln ρ = −∑ni=1wi lnwi.
3 Shenker’s Criticism and Henderson’s Reply
I will now briefly consider Shenker’s (1999) first criticism against von Neumann’s
argument and Henderson’s (2003) reply. According to Shenker, two assumptions were
made by von Neumann:
a) the thermodynamic entropy only changes during the compression, stages IV to V, and
b) the entropies of stage I and VII are the same.
As Shenker presents the argument, von Neumann’s conclusion was that the entropy must
thus have increased during the measurement process (I to II), to balance out the decrease
during the compression (IV to V).
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In order to show that von Neumann entropy and “classical entropy”7 are distinct, Shenker
points out an alleged discrepancy in behaviour, which supposedly takes place between
stages II and IV. Following her argument, let us first consider the change in von Neumann
entropy: at stage II, the system is in a mixed state and has positive von Neumann entropy.
At stage IV, the system is in a pure state and, so Shenker claims, has zero von Neumann
entropy by definition. The von Neumann entropy therefore must have decreased between II
and IV, that is, it must have decreased during the separation of the |+〉- and |−〉-systems.
“From a thermodynamic point of view” (p.42), however, the entropy has not changed
between II and IV. This is because “the entropy reduction of the separation is exactly
compensated by an entropy increase due to expansion” (Shenker, 1999, p.45). The
thermodynamic entropy instead changes between during the compression, IV to V.
According to Shenker, Thermodynamic entropy and von Neumann entropy therefore differ
in their behaviour since the reduction in thermodynamic entropy takes place at a later
stage (IV to V) than the reduction of von Neumann entropy (II to IV).
Henderson (2003) points out some deficiencies in Shenker’s argument that explain the
alleged discrepancy. She shows that the system at stage IV cannot be considered to be in
a pure state, as the gas’ spatial degrees of freedom ought also be taken into account in
addition to its spin degrees of freedom. The initial state of the system at stage I is then
given by |0〉 ⊗ ρβ, where ρβ is the thermal state of the system in contact with a heat bath
at inverse temperature β. The entropy change at stage II is then only due to the entropy
change of the spin degrees of freedom. Furthermore, even if we assume collapse, as
Shenker implicitly does, the entropy is still high, since “we lack knowledge of which pure
state the system is in” (Henderson, 2003, p.294, original emphasis). The separation step
between II and IV then only ‘labels’ the states in so far as they are associated with a
particular spatial area of the box, but this step does not change the entropy. The change
in entropy at the compression stage V is then due to a change of the entropy of the spatial
degrees of freedom.
4 Modern Criticism by Hemmo and Shenker
In a subsequently published, revised and amended version, Hemmo and Shenker (2006)
offer an amended proposal with a similar but slightly weakened claim. They assert that
“von Neumann’s argument does not establish a conceptual link between −Tr[ρ ln ρ] and
7Shenker does not distinguish between classical statistical mechanical entropy and thermodynamic
entropy at this point: “Classical thermodynamics concludes that the very separation [of two gases] means
a reduction of entropy. This is called entropy of mixing [...]” (Shenker, 1999, 39). Entropy of mixing
however has its origin in statistical and not phenomenological considerations.
7
the thermodynamic quantity (1/T )
∫
pdV (or dQ/T ) in the single particle gas [...]”
(Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.158, emphasis added). They therefore retain their position
that the von Neumann entropy cannot be empirically equivalent to the phenomenological
entropy, but restrict this inequivalence to the domain of single or sufficiently few particles.
Von Neumann and thermodynamic entropy, they argue, are effectively equivalent only in
the thermodynamic limit.
This section will discuss Shenker’s and Hemmo and Shenker’s (H&S) efforts to show
dissimilar behaviour between the two entropies and reveal that their argument is
problematic to the extent that it allows for pepetua mobile of the second kind. The
shortcoming will be identified as the failure to take into account the entropy contribution
of the measurement apparatus. I will make use of the famous one-particle engine
developed by Szilard’s (1929) in order to show that measurement based correlations with
an external agent cannot be ignored in the single particle limit, as they straightforwardly
lead to a violation of the second law. Once the entropy contribution of the measurement
apparatus is taken into account, however, the analogous behaviour of thermodynamic
entropy and von Neumann entropy for the joint system is restored.
The following argument, including any conceptual ambiguities, has been taken unamended
from (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006), with the exception that we represent the position of the
particle by the two orthogonal states |L〉 and |R〉, where L and R stand for ’Left’ and
’Right’, as opposed to Hemmo and Shenker’s mixed state ρ(L) representation. For the
remainder of the article I furthermore assume, just like H&S, that it is in fact possible to
treat a single quantum particle as a genuine thermodynamic system. An illustration of the
following steps can be found in Figure 2.
Step 1 (Preparation I): A quantum particle P is prepared in a spin-up eigenstate in the
x-direction, |+x〉P . Its initial location is given by |L〉P , where L and R refer to its position
in either the left or the right part of the box. The measuring apparatus M starts out in
the state |Ready〉M . The initial state of the particle is then given by the product state:
ρ(1) = |+x〉〈+x|P |L〉〈L|P |Ready〉〈Ready|M . (1)
Step 2 (Preparation II): In Step 2, a measurement in the spin z direction is performed,
leading to an entanglement of the measurement apparatus’ pointer states and the z spin
eigenstates. It is important to note that H&S do not specify the nature of the
measurement at this stage, i.e. whether they are working in a collapse or no-collapse
model. The state of the entire system is given by
ρ(2) = 12 (|+z〉〈+z|P |+〉〈+|M + |−z〉〈−z|P |−〉〈−|M) |L〉〈L|P , (2)
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Figure 2: Illustration of the Gedankenexperiment following Hemmo and Shenker (2006). (1) the
particle is prepared in a spin-x up eigenstate. (2) A spin-z measurement is performed on the
particle. (3) Depending on the outcome, the particle is moved to the right side of the box or
remains in the left side via semi-permeable membranes. (4) A location measurement is performed.
(5) The empty side of the box is compressed. (6) & (7) The system is brought back to its original
state.
while the reduced density matrix of the particle becomes:
ρ(2,red) = 12 (|+z〉〈+z|P + |−z〉〈−z|P ) |L〉〈L|P , (3)
which, as H&S state, “in some interpretations may be taken to describe our ignorance of
the z spin of P” (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.160).
Whereas the von Neumann entropy of the spin component SvN = −Tr[ρ ln ρ] was zero
before, it now becomes positive. The thermodynamic entropy however, the authors assert,
remains the same.
Step 3 (Separation): Two semi-permeable membranes are inserted and moved through
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the box in such a way that the particle remains on the left if it is in state |+z〉 but is
moved to the right if it is in state |−z〉. There is no work cost involved in this process and
neither von Neumann entropy nor thermodynamic entropy change during this step, during
which the spatial degrees of freedom are coupled to the spin degrees of freedom.
Step 4 (Measurement): As we are only considering a single molecule in this setup as
opposed to von Neumann’s original many particle gas, the compression stage needs to be
preceded by a location measurement in order to determine which part of the box is empty.
H&S therefore introduce a further measurement before compression (not present in von
Neumann’s original argument), in order to determine in which part of the box the particle
is located.
H&S add that for the calculation of the von Neumann entropy, collapse and no-collapse
interpretations will now have to use different expressions for the quantum state. In
collapse theories, the state as a result of the location measurement collapses into either
ρ(4,+) = |+z〉 〈+z|P |L〉〈L|P or ρ(4,−) = |−z〉 〈−z|P |R〉〈R|P , . (4)
For no-collapse interpretations on the other hand, the system’s state is given by the
reduced density matrix:
ρ(4,red) = 12 |+z〉 〈+z|P |L〉〈L|P +
1
2 |−z〉 〈−z|P |R〉〈R|P . (5)
The thermodynamic entropy, STD, as the authors stress, is not influenced by the position
measurement and does not change during this step, in the sense–presumably–that no heat
flows into, or out, of the system in consequence of this measurement . By contrast they
urge, whether the von Neumann entropy changes, depends on whether we consider
collapse or no-collapse interpretations. In the case of collapse interpretations the von
Neumann entropy of the system allegedly decreases, whereas in the case of no-collapse
interpretations, it remains the same.
Step 5 (Compression): The box is isothermally compressed back to its original volume
V . The change in thermodynamic entropy during this step is normally given by
STD = (1/T )
∫
pdV , however, since there is no work involved in the compression against
the vacuum, H&S argue, the thermodynamic entropy does not change at Step 5. In fact,
the thermodynamic entropy does not change throughout the whole experiment, the
authors claim.
Step 6 (Return to Initial State): The system is brought back to its initial state by
unitary transformations with no entropy cost. “[...] [T]he measuring device need also be
10
returned to its initial ready state. One can do that unitarily.” (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006,
161).
H&S’s main criticism thereby focuses on the fact that the thermodynamic entropy remains
constant throughout the experiment, whereas the von Neumann entropy does not:
Therefore, whatever changes occur in Trρ ln ρ during the experiment, they cannot be
taken to compensate for (1/T )
∫
pdV since the latter is null throughout the
experiment. (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.162)
5 Discussion of Hemmo and Shenker’s (2006)
Argument
This section will discuss the argument presented above and identify two problems. The
first concerns a wrong calculation of the von Neumann entropy during the Step 4 location
measurement. The second problem regards the suggested unitary reset of the
measurement apparatus.
5.1 Redundancy of the Step 4 Location Measurement
I will begin the discussion of the above with some general observations, in order to provide
some more clarity. For this, we recall that according to Hemmo and Shenker, the only
difference between their and von Neumann’s original thought experiment is that a further
measurement, a location measurement (Step 4), is needed to determine the molecule’s
location prior to the compression stage. For gases at the thermodynamic limit, this
measurement becomes redundant, since the amount of molecules on each side of the box
becomes proportional to their respective occupying volume. Not so for single molecules,
for which, before the empty side of the box can be compressed (with probability one), a
location measurement is required in order to determine which side the particle is on.
Contrary to H&S’s assertions, however, the location measurement during Step 4 is not
needed. A spin z measurement already took place at Step 2 and the outcome of this
measurement will be fully correlated with the position of the particle after the separation
in Step 3. And so instead of introducing yet another auxiliary system that performs a
location measurement on the particle, it would have been sufficient to read out the
measurement result of the spin z measurement.
In the case of collapse, for example, the particle will have already collapsed into a spin
eigenstate during the Step 2 measurement. The correlations established during the
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location measurement will thereby all be classical and reading out the spin-measurement
result is sufficient to predict the particle’s location after the separation. In the case of
no-collapse interpretations, system and (spin-)measurement apparatus become entangled
during Step 2:
|Ψ〉(2) = 1√
2
(|+z〉P |+〉M + |−z〉P |−〉M) |L〉P (6)
During the separation in Step 3, the particle’s spatial degree of freedom becomes entangled
with its spin degree of freedom. This means that the state of the overall system is:
|Ψ〉(3) = 1√
2
(|+z〉P |+〉M |L〉P + |−z〉P |−〉M |R〉P ) . (7)
Therefore, for both collapse and no-collapse cases it is in fact sufficient to read out the
measurement result of the Step 2 spin measurement in order to determine the location of
the particle after the separation process.
Having two instead of one measurement(s) would not be much of a problem, if it weren’t
the case that for H&S, the two measurements have different consequences for the von
Neumann entropy. This is the first inconsistency in their argument: whereas H&S agree
that after the spin z measurement at Step 2 the post spin measurement density matrix of
the particle is given by
ρ(2,red) = 12 (|+z〉〈+z|P + |−z〉〈−z|P ) |L〉〈L|P , (8)
they do not apply the same reasoning to the post location measurement state of the system
at Step 4. Instead, they use a ‘collapsed’ density matrix to calculate the von Neumann
entropy:
ρ(4,+) = |+z〉〈+z|P |L〉〈L|P or ρ(4,−) = |−z〉〈−z|P |R〉〈R|P . (9)
In the first case, the (spin) measurement has therefore increased the entropy, whereas in
the second case the (location) measurement has effectively reduced it. What is going on?
Let me first try to assemble what the authors themselves could have had in mind. In von
Neumann’s original argument, the Step 2 spin measurement is non-selective8, which means
that even if the system has de facto collapsed into one of its eigenstates, an external
8Or rather should have been, given that von Neumann himself begins his argument with a spin mixture.
This however does not matter for conceptual purposes.
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agent9 would not be able to determine into which state the system has collapsed and
would therefore describe the system by a density matrix ρ(2,red). The system would be in a
so-called proper mixture, meaning that it is possible to understand ρ as representing a
probability distribution over pure states10. The von Neumann entropy of the system at
Step 2 has thereby increased compared to its previous state, in agreement with what von
Neumann considers being the irreversibility of a ‘Prozess 1’.
The Step 4 location measurement on the other hand is selective — it establishes
correlations between the agent who performs the measurement11 and the system. These
correlations then allow the agent to perform further operations on the system, such as the
Step 5 compression of the box. For H&S, the von Neumann entropy of the system at Step
4 has therefore decreased from Step 3.
Since H&S want to include the non-selective spin-measurement at Step 2, the Step 4
location measurement is indeed a necessary requirement for the single particle case, given
that the compression is not being allowed to be conditional on the outcome of the Step 2
measurement. Without the selective measurement, the work-free compression against
vacuum could not take place. The limiting case of infinite particles (and in fact von
Neumann’s original account) does not require this selective measurement since the amount
of particles within each chamber of the box becomes equal.
The problem with including a second measurement on the system is that this second
measurement also introduces a second measurement apparatus. It will be shown shortly
that H&S’s conclusion is based on an erroneous calculation of the von Neumann entropy
when the system is correlated to this second measurement apparatus. Before elaborating
on this point however, I would like to discuss another shortcoming of their argument.
5.2 Violation of the Second Law
H&S notably claim that the thermodynamic entropy change is zero throughout the whole
cycle and in particular, that at the end of the cycle “[...] the measuring device [can be
9Some words of clarification regarding my use of the term ‘agent’: an agent does or course not need to
be a human being but can be anything that is able to measure and react to the measurement outcome
accordingly. For this reason I will use the term ‘agent’ interchangeably with the term ‘measurement
apparatus’ or even ‘memory cell’, implying that even a simple binary system can serve as an ‘agent’. Using
the term ‘agent’ in this way therefore does not imply subjectivity of any kind.
10In the case of no-collapse interpretations and ignoring decoherence, the agent is not yet entangled
with the system. She only becomes entangled once she performs the Step 4 location measurement.
11More precisely the location measurement apparatus, but I will take those two to be synonymous for
the time being.
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returned to its initial ready state] unitarily.” (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.161), and
hence without any heat cost.
To appreciate the consequences of this claim, let us assume that it is indeed possible to
unitarily bring the measurement apparatus back to its original position without a
compensating heat transfer into the environment, as H&S claim. We may then construct a
slightly amended version of their proposed cycle. For this amended version, the only thing
we change is Step 5, which instead of being a compression we turn into an isothermal
expansion. This means that instead of compressing the empty side against the vacuum, we
let the particle push against the partition in a quasi-static, isothermal fashion. Given that
the position of the particle is ‘known’ as a result of the location measurement, it is
possible to attach a weight to the partition, thereby extracting kT ln 2 units of work from
the system during the expansion, while the according amount of heat is delivered from the
heat reservoir. After the work extraction, the measurement apparatus is brought back to
its initial state (which according to H&S can be done for free). The partition is then
re-inserted into the original system (for free), the position of the particle measured again
(for free) and the above process is repeated, thereby extracting arbitrarily large amounts of
work from this one-particle engine with the sole effect being that heat is extracted from a
single reservoir. This constitutes a direct violation of the Kelvin-Planck statement of the
second law (Planck, 1991).
Von Neumann himself, as the authors acknowledge, states that
[...] in the sense of phenomenological thermodynamics, each conceivable process
constitutes valid evidence, provided that it does not conflict with the two
fundamental laws of thermodynamics.” (von Neumann, 1996, p.192)12,
and so at this point, one might already conclude that Hemmo and Shenker’s argument
fails, as their suggested unitary reset does conflict with one of the fundamental laws of
thermodynamics.
It should be noted, however, that there exists some controversy in the literature about
whether or not we ought to expect the second law to hold in the single particle case and
whether or not thermodynamic considerations in these cases are indeed acceptable13
(Maxwell, 1878; Earman and Norton, 1999; Norton, 2013; Hemmo and Shenker, 2012). In
fact H&S elsewhere have expressed skepticism on whether the second law holds in such
cases (Hemmo and Shenker, 2012). While it seems reasonable to assume that in the article
12[...] im Sinne der phänomenologischen Thermodynamik ist jeder denkbare Prozess beweiskräftig,
wenn er die beiden Hauptsätze nicht verletzt.
13I am grateful to two anonymous referees for prompting me to elaborate on this point.
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under consideration the second law is required to hold (after all, the article is about
comparing the thermodynamic entropy with the von Neumann entropy and the authors
explicitly state that they “do not address this issue” of skepticism here (Hemmo and
Shenker, 2006, p.158)), it is worth emphasising that the above violation is a reliable
violation of the second law. This means that even if one is willing to sacrifice the strict
second law which states that entropy should never decrease, and instead adapts either a
statistical or a probabilistic version of the second law14, the problem with the above case is
that we are confronted with a violation that allows us to extract work from the heat
reservoir 100% of the time. It allows us to extract work reliably and continuously, and so
is a particularly serious version of a Maxwell’s demon.
A common strategy to recover the second law from situations like the one presented above,
is to invoke Landauer’s principle (Landauer, 1961; Bennett, 1973). It states that there is a
heat cost involved with the resetting of the measurement apparatus to its initial state and
is widely accepted in the physics community.15 For the case presented above, the resetting
of the memory cell would then lead to an increase of heat in the environment, thereby
offsetting the previous entropy decrease.16
And indeed, this is what is required in the present case, for contrary to H&S’s assertion, a
unitary reset of the measurement device is not possible. To see this, we consider the end
of the cycle. The measurement device then is in one of the two mutually exclusive states
|−〉M or |+〉M . As can be easily seen, there then exist no unitary operator that reliably
maps the memory cell back to its initial, ready state {|−〉M , |+〉M} 7→ |ready〉M . The
only way to reset the measurement device unitarily is if one recorded beforehand in which
one of the two mutually exclusive states the device is in. To do so, however, one requires a
measurement on the measurement device itself, performed by a second measurement
device. But then one would want to reset this second measurement device unitarily, too,
for which a third device would be needed and so on. Eventually, one would run out of
resources and a Landauer type reset, at a cost, becomes unavoidable.
14The statistical version, that Maxwell adapted, takes the second law to be a statistical, as opposed
to mathematical, truth that holds for macroscopic systems where fluctuations are rare. Naturally, the
statistical second law does not hold anymore for microscopic systems where fluctuations become relevant.
The alternative is a probabilistic version, which rules out the reliable extraction of work from a single
heat reservoir. For this probabilistic law, system size seems less of an issue. See also Maroney (2009a) or
Myrvold (2011) for a distinction between these different versions.
15Notably, some philosophers have challenged its validity (Earman and Norton, 1999; Norton, 2011),
while others have made arguments in its favour (Ladyman et al., 2007; Maroney, 2009b; Ladyman and
Robertson, 2013; Wallace, 2014)
16Note that once we take into account this heat cost, H&S original one-particle cycle ceases to be
entropy neutral, as the resetting step will lead to an entropy increase in the environment.
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Which Entropy?
Notwithstanding the above criticism, H&S’s main point is that the von Neumann entropy
(as opposed to the thermodynamic entropy) during the Step 4 location measurement
decreases, and that this gives us reason to reject their conceptual equivalence, still stands,
or seems to.
As a result of the location measurement, the von Neumann entropy decreases back
to its original value. (Hemmo and Shenker, 2006, p.163)
In this section I will discuss this claim and in particular I will show that:
(i) The physically relevant entity is the joint entropy of system and measurement
apparatus. It remains the same.
(ii) It is the system’s so-called conditional entropy that decreases during the
measurement, not the system’s marginal von Neumann entropy.
I will now begin with a justification of the two claims. In phenomenological
thermodynamics, the joint entropy of two systems is always the sum of their respective
entropies. The von Neumann (in the classical case the Gibbs-) entropy on the other hand
is generally subadditive and additive only in the absence of correlations between two
systems:
H(S,M) ≤ H(S) +H(M), (10)
where S stands for ‘system’ and M stands for ‘measurement apparatus’ or ‘memory cell’.
In the concrete case of the Step 4 location measurement, we can model the measurement
apparatus M as a box containing a single molecule and divided by a partition. It can then
be in one of two mutually exclusive states, corresponding to the position of the molecule,
left (l) or right (r). We assume it needs to be in a ‘ready’-state before the measurement,
which we chose to be l. The entropy is zero, in this case. If we consider the case of
collapse, then at the time of the measurement the system will have already collapsed into
a spin eigenstate. The correlations between the location of the system and the
measurement apparatus are then all essentially classical and the von Neumann entropy
before the measurement can be rewritten as:
H(S) = −kB
∑
s=l,r
p(s) log p(s), (11)
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where p(s) is the probability of the system being in the left or right chamber of the box.
Before the Step 4 location measurement, system and measurement apparatus are not
correlated, and their joint entropy is given by H3(S,M) = H3(S) +H3(M), where 3 is
taken to denote ‘Stage 3’, or, in other words, ‘before the Step 4 measurement’. During the
measurement, the memory cell will align itself with the position of the particle and the
two systems become correlated. The joint entropy now cannot be expressed anymore as
the sum of the individual entropies and instead becomes
H4(S,M) = H4(S|M) +H4(M) ≤ H4(S) +H4(M), (12)
with H(S|M) being the so-called conditional entropy, which quantifies how much S is
correlated with M and which is given by
H(S|M) = −kB
∑
s,m
p(s,m) ln p(s|m) (13)
= −kB
∑
m
p(m)
∑
s
p(s|m) ln p(s|m) (14)
= kB
∑
m
p(m)H(s). (15)
p(s) and p(m) are the probabilities that system and memory cell are found in macrostate
s = ls, rs or m = lm, rm respectively, p(m, s) is their joint probability and p(s|m) the
conditional probability, with H(s) = −kB∑s p(s|m) ln p(s|m). The conditional entropy is
non-negative and is maximal when system and measurement apparatus are uncorrelated, ,
0 ≤ H(S|M) ≤ H(S), in which case Equation (12) reduces to Equation (10). It is often
considered to be the entropy relative to an agent (in this case the measurement apparatus).
Let us now go back to H&S’s claim that the von Neumann entropy of the system decreases
during the location measurement. Does it? The answer is no. What decreases, however, is
the conditional entropy relative to the measurement apparatus:
H3(S|M) ≥ H4(S|M). (16)
It reduces to zero, because system and measurement apparatus become perfectly
correlated during the measurement. And so when H&S claim that the system’s entropy
has decreased, what they mean is that the system’s conditional entropy has decreased.
But the conditional entropy is distinct from the marginal entropy. Re-writing the joint
entropy of system and measurement apparatus demonstrates this:
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H4(S,M) = H4(S|M) +H4(M) = H4(M |S) +H4(S). (17)
As opposed to phenomenological thermodynamics, which treats systems as black boxes,
(classical and quantum) statistical mechanics is able to detect correlations between
subsystems, allowing us to mathematically handle the concept of ‘measurement’ in the first
place. If we associate entropy with the potential to (reliably) extract work from a system,
then the conditional entropy certainly quantifies this ability to a certain extent: a memory
cell endowed with an automaton would now be able to (reliably) extract work from the
system by allowing it to isothermally expand into the other half of the box, thereby raising
a weight. Contrary to an external agent who is not correlated to the particle location. But
this is just the ordinary Maxwell’s demon scenario17 applied to a one-particle setting.
What becomes important for thermodynamic treatments in such a setting, is the joint
entropy of system and measurement apparatus, as the joint system (ideally) has no
correlations with the outside and can thus be treated as a thermodynamic black box. And
it turns out that the behaviour of the thermodynamic entropy of the joint system, is
exactly mirrored by the behaviour of the von Neumann entropy: the joint entropy of
system and measurement apparatus does not change during the location measurement,
but remains the same:
H3(S,M) = H4(S,M). (18)
And so, to summarise the above: all that changes during the location measurement is the
conditional entropy, but neither the joint entropy of the system nor the marginal entropy
H(S). Furthermore, the joint entropy, just as the thermodynamic entropy of the joint
system, remain the same during the location measurement.
5.3 No Collapse Scenarios
Let us now consider the case of no collapse scenarios. In no collapse scenarios, following
the measurement in Step 4, the measurement apparatus and the location degree of
17As mentioned before, Maxwell in 1867 introduced the idea of a “very observant and neat-fingered
being” (as cited in (Maxwell, 1995)), which was intended to demonstrate that the orthodox second law of
thermodynamics could be broken in principle by exploiting fluctuations. In the thought experiment, a box
filled with monoatomic gas is divided into two parts by a partition into which a small door is inbuilt. The
“being”, later called Maxwell’s demon, controls every atom that approaches the door and either lets the
atom pass or not. Since the gas molecules are subject to a velocity distribution, he can decide to only let
the fast molecules pass into the one direction and to only let slow molecules pass into the other direction.
By doing so the demon creates a temperature gradient, allowing him to violate the second law.
18
freedom become entangled. The reduced density matrix after tracing out the decohering
environment therefore is given by an inproper mixture due to the neglect of the
correlations with the environment. After the Step 4 measurement, the density matrix of
the combined system and measurement apparatus is given by
ρ(4,P+M) = 12 (|+z〉〈+z|P |L〉〈L|P |L〉〈L|M + |−z〉〈−z|P |R〉〈R|P |R〉〈R|M) , (19)
where now |L〉M and |R〉M represent the states of the measurement apparatus. The
correlations between the measurement apparatus and the system are of a classical nature
and so also in the absence of collapse, the von Neumann entropy of system and apparatus
has not changed during the Step 4 measurement.
6 Conclusion
This article considers von Neumann’s introduction of −Trρ ln ρ as the quantum mechanical
generalisation of thermodynamic entropy. In particular, it shows that an argument raised
by Shenker (1999) and Hemmo and Shenker (2006) against the equivalence of von
Neumann and thermodynamic entropy is problematic because a) their reasoning allows for
a violation of the second law of thermodynamics and b) the alleged disparate behaviour in
von Neumann and thermodynamic entropy during the Step 4 location measurement is in
fact due to a wrong calculation of the von Neumann entropy. It is in fact the system’s
conditional entropy that decreases during the step, leading to the seemingly disparate
behaviour of the two entropies. Finally, the article shows that the relevant quantum
entropy, the joint entropy of system and measurement apparatus, remains unchanged
during the location measurement and thus exactly mirrors the thermodynamic entropy.
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Appendix: Von Neumann, Entropy and Single
Particles
In his original setup, von Neumann introduced a ‘gas’ consisting of individual quantum
systems, locked up in boxes and placed in a further, giant box18. The ‘gas’ represents a
imaginary statistical but finite ensemble. The density operator, which he calls the
‘statistical operator’, can only relate to such a Gesamtheit. This means that even in the
case of an individual quantum system, von Neumann’s argument would remain unchanged:
the density operator of this individual quantum system would still relate to an ensemble
of systems and a system containing a single particle would therefore still be modeled as an
N particle ensemble. The statistical representations of a) a system containing a single
particle, and b) a system containing many particles, are therefore identical. This, however,
does not imply that von Neumann denies the meaningful application of thermodynamics
to individual particles, quite the contrary: von Neumann explicitly considers the case of a
single particle in a box (von Neumann, 1996, p.212). He uses the example to demonstrate
that the capacity of an agent to extract work from such a single-particle thermodynamic
system depends on the agent’s state of knowledge about the position of the particle and
therefore adopts what one might call an epistemic interpretation of entropy:
The temporal variations of the entropy are due to the fact that the observer does
not know everything, or rather that he cannot determine (measure) everything, that
is in principle measurable. (von Neumann, 1996, p.213)19
While one may raise several severe objections to this reading of entropy and the density
operator, the above nevertheless shows that von Neumann’s argument in its original
intention not only applies to large (macroscopic) systems, but also for small (microscopic)
systems.
18Such a setup was first proposed by Einstein (1914)
19“Die zeitlichen Variationen der Entropie rühren also daher, dass der Beobachter nicht alles weiss, bzw.
dass er nicht alles ermitteln (messen) kann, was prinzipiell messbar ist.”
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